Philosophical Notes #1: On the other side of the private language argument

Extending Wittgenstein's private language argument to the other edge of language: transcendence

Central Idea: The private language argument, often understood as setting a limit on the privacy of language for it to remain meaningful, can be extended to suggest a complementary limit on its universality or totality. Just as language cannot be entirely private without losing its grip on meaning, it also cannot be meaningfully about the All, the totality of existence, in a completely unqualified sense. These two constraints – the need for publicness and the limitations of totality – may define a "circle" within which language operates most robustly and meaningfully. The private language argument draws a line at the individual, the transcendental language argument draws a line at totality.

1. The Inner Boundary: The Private Language Argument

Wittgenstein's private language argument demonstrates that meaning is not a purely internal, subjective affair. Language is fundamentally a social practice. Meaning emerges from shared rules, public criteria for correctness, and the possibility of correction and agreement within a community of language users. A language genuinely understandable only by a single individual, lacking any external check or shared context, lacks the essential scaffolding for meaning. It becomes ungrounded and prone to arbitrary interpretation. This establishes an inner boundary to meaningful language: it must be sufficiently public and grounded in shared practices.

2. The Outer Boundary: The Problem of "Language about the All"

This note proposes an outer boundary, arising from the limitations of language when attempting to encompass "the All," the totality of existence, or the universe as a whole in its entirety. While we can meaningfully discuss the universe as a vast and complex system within our conceptual framework, attempts to make statements about the Universe as the sum of all things encounter significant problems:

• Lack of External Validation: Statements about "the All" inherently lack an external point of reference for validation or correction. If we assert "the universe is X," there is no independent standpoint outside the universe to verify this claim. Traditional methods of meaning verification, which rely on comparison with external reality or shared agreement, break down.

• Loss of Contrast and Differentiation: Meaning often emerges through contrast and differentiation. We understand concepts by distinguishing them from others (e.g., "red" is understood in contrast to "blue," "square" in contrast to "circle"). When we speak of "the All," we lose these essential contrasts. There is nothing outside of "the All" to provide differentiation or define its boundaries in a meaningful way. "The All" risks becoming an empty, undifferentiated concept.

• Presupposing an Impossible Standpoint: Conceptualizing and describing "the All" often implicitly presupposes a logically problematic "view from nowhere" – a transcendent perspective outside of all existence from which we could survey and characterize the totality. This imagined standpoint is arguably incoherent.

3. The Circle of Meaningful Language:

These two boundaries – the inner limit of privacy and the outer limit of totality – can be visualized as defining a "circle" or domain where language operates most effectively and robustly. Within this circle, language is grounded in shared practices, capable of differentiation and validation, and meaningfully applied within contexts that are neither excessively private nor impossibly totalizing.

4. Implications and Examples:

• Everyday Language & Science: Most everyday language and much of scientific discourse operate comfortably within this circle. They deal with specific objects, events, systems, and testable hypotheses that are publicly accessible and subject to validation within shared frameworks.

• Metaphysical Language: When language ventures into deeply metaphysical questions about "Being," "Ultimate Reality," or "the Universe as a Whole" in a totalizing sense, it strains against the outer boundary of this circle. This doesn't necessarily render such inquiries entirely meaningless, but it suggests that their "meaning" operates differently, often relying more on metaphor, analogy, conceptual exploration, and perhaps less on straightforward factual assertion or empirical validation. The type of meaningfulness shifts as we approach this boundary.

• Critique of Block Universe (Revisited): The initial critique of the block universe theory, suggesting it requires an impossible "view from nowhere," can be understood in this light. It highlights the tendency to implicitly seek a totalizing perspective when considering the "universe as a whole," pushing against the outer boundary of meaningful language.

Conclusion:

This extended understanding of the private language argument suggests a more nuanced picture of the limits and possibilities of language. Meaningful language is not only constrained by the need for publicness and shared practices, but also by the inherent limitations of attempting to capture the totality of existence. The "circle of meaningful language" metaphor offers a valuable framework for understanding these constraints and for appreciating the different kinds of meaning that language can achieve as it navigates the space between excessive privacy and impossible totality.

It suggests a "Goldilocks zone" where language is most robust and effective – a space of shared context, differentiation, and limited, contextualized reference.